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Religious Speech in the
Military: Freedoms and
Limitations
David E. Fitzkee
Introduction

T

he freedom to speak and to freely exercise one’s religion are two central
guarantees of the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Military
members retain these foundational rights,1 which the courts broadly protect.
But there are characteristics of the military—including its rank structure and
the need for good order and discipline essential to accomplishing the military’s
crucial mission—that justify constraints on the religious speech of all military members beyond what would be constitutionally tolerable in the civilian
context. Moreover, additional constraints are imposed on military leaders’ religious speech by virtue of their rank and position. This article addresses what
military leaders2 need to know about rights and limitations on religious speech,3
both their subordinates’ and their own. After examining the freedom of religious
speech and three constitutional limitations, the article highlights three selected
religious speech issues: proselytizing, official prayer, and religious displays.
It concludes by providing leaders ten guiding principles on religious speech.4
It is crucial that military leaders understand and respect the scope of
religious speech rights. Honoring the constitutional rights of subordinates is
inherently the “right thing to do” in a society and military governed by the
rule of law, particularly when all military leaders take an oath to support the
Constitution. Infringing subordinates’ rights—for example, by the leader’s
own improper religious speech or by failing to allow subordinates to exercise
their religious rights—may adversely affect the unit’s ability to execute its
mission. Ours is a military characterized by many kinds of diversity, including
religious beliefs. Effective leaders leverage that diversity by bringing together
the backgrounds, skills, perspectives, and talents of the members in a way that
maximizes the unit’s ability to perform. Members whose religious rights and
beliefs are not honored may feel alienated and marginalized. If a superior’s
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religious speech has created a climate of perceived favoritism toward subordinates who share the superior’s beliefs, subordinates with different beliefs might
reasonably question whether they will get a fair shake when it comes time for
performance reports and other opportunities. All of this can affect their morale
and contribution to the team effort.
Failure to understand the rights and limits concerning religious speech
can adversely affect the mission in other important ways. It can result in internal
investigations into allegations of violations or even lawsuits against the military,
both of which entail substantial time, effort, and distraction from the mission.
These investigations and lawsuits also may result in adverse media attention,
which can undermine public confidence and support of the military. At its worst,
failure to understand the parameters of permissible religious speech can jeopardize the United States’ strategic interests abroad, for example, by providing
fodder for our enemies’ claims that we are engaged in a holy war against Islam.
These lapses, occasioned by religious speech that exceeds permissible limits,
can also harm the stature of leaders. Unfortunately, examples of these leadership lapses abound.5 This article aspires to help reduce the number of future
examples.

Religious Speech and the Free Speech Clause
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government, including the military, from “abridging the freedom of speech.” Speech
is construed broadly and includes both oral and written speech, as well as
expressive conduct and displays when intended to convey a message that is
likely to be understood.7 Religious speech is certainly included.
As a bedrock constitutional right, freedom of speech has enjoyed
great protection from the courts, particularly when the government suppresses
speech because it does not like its content. Courts subject such “content-based”
regulation of speech to “strict scrutiny,” the most rigorous standard of judicial
review. Under this scrutiny, the content-based governmental action is presumptively invalid unless the government can prove both a compelling interest in
limiting that speech and that the means of suppression is necessary to achieve
that interest.8
What this means for leaders is that they should not single out religious
speech for special limitation just because it is religious. If some personal conversations are permitted in the workplace during duty hours (e.g., pertaining
to sports or social events), leaders cannot place religion off-limits. The same is
true regarding religious displays in the barracks: if personal nonreligious items
are permitted to be displayed in rooms, religious items must be permitted to the
same extent. Otherwise, the discrimination against religious speech would be
content-based and would almost certainly not survive scrutiny by the courts or
by military investigators looking into a complaint.9
The government has much more latitude in constraining speech when
the limitations are “content-neutral.” These are incidental limitations on speech
which may arise when the government regulates for some other legitimate
6
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purpose. For example, all branches of the military have uniform and grooming or appearance regulations furthering legitimate interests in uniformity,
cohesion, and esprit-de-corps. These regulations may have the ancillary effect
of limiting religious speech (broadly construed): military members may not
wear nonconforming religiously-motivated clothing, headgear, facial hair, or
jewelry while in uniform. Similarly, if the military prohibits use of extraneous
quotes or materials in e-mails, that prohibition would apply also to religious
quotes in e-mails. In these examples, military members’ religious speech has
been limited, but permissibly so. In “nonpublic forums” such as military bases,
courts have upheld such incidental limitations on speech as long as there is a
valid reason for the regulation.10 Courts will give great deference to the military’s determination that the underlying regulation has a legitimate purpose.11
Thus, content-neutral regulations are one limitation on all military members’
religious speech rights.
The second limitation on religious speech is grounded in the judiciallycreated concept of “unprotected speech.” The Supreme Court has recognized
several narrow categories of speech that serve no First Amendment purpose
and which the government can therefore limit, prohibit, or punish, even on
the basis of content. The most significant category of unprotected speech for
military members, recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1974 leading case
of Parker v. Levy, is speech that may “undermine the effectiveness of response
to command.”12 The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the
highest military appellate court, has interpreted that phrase to mean speech
that “interferes with or prevents the orderly accomplishment of the mission or
presents a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, mission, or morale of the troops.”13
Again, courts are likely to give some deference to the military’s determination that speech adversely affects the military. Thus, if military members are
prosecuted for their speech under the Uniform Code of Military Justice—for
example, under Article 133 (conduct unbecoming an officer) or Article 134
(conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces)—the First Amendment’s freedom of speech will not
provide them a shield for their speech if it meets the definition of unprotected
speech.
This category of unprotected speech applies to religious speech that falls
within its scope. Much religious speech will be protected, however, because it
will not endanger the mission, loyalty, discipline, or morale so as to become
“unprotected speech.” But when religious speech crosses that line, leaders can
take action against the speaker; consultation with their judge advocate general
(JAG) is recommended. For example, an exhortation by a religiously motivated
pacifist military member to refuse to fight would be actionable.

Religious Speech and the Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from impermissibly
burdening the free exercise of religion. In contrast to the Free Speech Clause,
which protects primarily speech, the Free Exercise Clause protects primarily
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religiously motivated conduct,14 such as worship, dietary restrictions, ceremonies, and other practices. The clauses can become blurred because courts have
expanded “speech” to include conduct (when intended and likely to convey a
message) and have said that the free exercise of religion includes the right to
profess religious beliefs.15
The Supreme Court has reviewed free exercise challenges using substantially the same analysis as when reviewing content-neutral restrictions on
free speech in a nonpublic forum: laws limiting the free exercise of religion are
permissible as long as they are “religion-neutral” and are otherwise valid (i.e.,
they rationally relate to some permissible governmental purpose).16 Religionbased laws—those specifically targeting religious conduct—would be subject
to the same strict scrutiny that content-based laws—those aimed to suppress a
particular message—are.17 Leaders should thus avoid targeting religious practices, just as they avoid singling out religious speech for disfavored treatment.
The leading example of the constitutional approach the Supreme Court
has taken regarding military religion-neutral limitations on the free exercise of
religion is Goldman v. Weinberger,18 decided in 1986. Captain Goldman—an
Air Force doctor, Orthodox Jew, and ordained rabbi—regularly wore a yarmulke in uniform indoors, which violated an Air Force uniform regulation.
When his commander ordered him to comply with the regulation under threat
of court-martial, Goldman sued the Secretary of Defense. He claimed that his
First Amendment free exercise rights entitled him to wear the yarmulke, despite
the regulation. The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the religion-neutral
regulation as it applied to Captain Goldman. The Court held that the regulation,
which essentially permitted wearing religious items in uniform only when they
were not visible, was reasonably related to the military’s legitimate interest in
uniformity.19 This relaxed standard of judicial review gave great deference to
the military’s determination of the importance of uniformity.
Four years after Goldman, the Supreme Court applied this relaxed standard of judicial review of religion-neutral laws that impact the free exercise
of religion in the civilian context.20 Congress, however, was dissatisfied with
the relatively little protection the Supreme Court gave to the free exercise of
religion in this later civilian case. It, therefore, enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993,21 supplanting Goldman and the later civilian case.22
This statute requires courts to use strict scrutiny—the same, most-demanding
standard courts use to review laws that target particular protected speech or
religious practices—even for neutral laws that only incidentally burden the free
exercise of religion. Thus, when a religion-neutral federal law,23 which includes
military regulations and orders, substantially burdens the exercise of religion, the
government must demonstrate that the law furthers a compelling governmental
interest and is the least restrictive way of furthering that interest. Essentially,
the government must prove that it has a compelling reason why it cannot grant
a religious exception to the generally applicable law.24 This is a much higher
standard of review than for content-neutral restrictions on speech, so it becomes
very important to distinguish speech from exercise, even when the Supreme
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Court has sometimes blurred the distinction. The difficulty and importance of
the distinction underscores the need for leaders to consult with the JAG before
taking action that limits a subordinate’s religious speech or exercise.

Religious Speech and the Establishment Clause
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause provides additional individual protection for religious speech and exercise by prohibiting the government
from making any “law respecting an establishment of religion.” This clause
complements individuals’ religious speech and practice rights by limiting what
the government, including military members acting in an official capacity, can
do to promote religion. The Establishment Clause thus is the third limitation on
religious speech. For military leaders, who in many circumstances are acting as
representatives of the government, this is the most important limitation on their
own right of religious speech. For this reason, we will examine in some detail
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
The overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is government
neutrality toward religion: government must take no action that either favors
one religion over another or favors religion generally over nonreligion.25 The
seminal Supreme Court case interpreting the Establishment Clause is Lemon
v. Kurtzman,26 in which the Court articulated three requirements that the challenged governmental action must meet in order to satisfy the Establishment
Clause. First, the governmental action at issue must have a nonreligious
purpose. Second, the primary effect of the governmental action cannot advance
(or inhibit) religion. Third, the governmental action cannot result in excessive
government entanglement with religion.27 In the religious speech context, the
“effect” and (to a lesser extent) “purpose” prongs are the most important.
In deciding whether governmental action (especially prayer) violates
Lemon’s “effect” prong, courts sometimes look to whether the government
is coercing people “to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”28 For
example, an appellate court struck down Virginia Military Institute’s evening
meal prayer due to its coercive nature in the military context.29 Military leaders
must be extremely cautious that they do not use their rank and position to
coerce subordinates.
Short of coercion, religious speech can also violate Lemon’s “effect”
prong if it appears to the reasonable and informed observer that the government is endorsing religion by “conveying or attempting to convey a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”30 Religious
speech by a military leader can thus violate the Establishment Clause when it
reasonably appears that the leader, acting in an official capacity for the military,
is promoting religion. A similar but broader prohibition appears in the Joint
Ethics Regulation, which prohibits governmental personnel from using their
position, title, or authority in a way that reasonably could imply that the government endorses the employee’s personal activities.31
Military installations have chaplains’ programs to enable military
members to freely exercise their religion. Those programs may include worship,
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religious studies, invited speakers, spiritual retreats, concerts, plays, prayer
meetings, and prayer breakfasts. To avoid the appearance that military leaders
in their official capacity are endorsing or coercing religion, they should leave
the advertisement and administration of these programs to the chaplains.32 The
chaplains’ role and their position outside the normal chain of command allow
them to even-handedly advertise these opportunities without the potential for
perceptions of selective endorsement or coercion that may exist if military leaders
advertise the programs. Of course, leaders maintain the right to freely exercise
their religion and therefore may attend and participate in these programs, just as
other military members may. As they do so, however, leaders should avoid roles
in these functions that create the impression of official endorsement or coercion
of religion. Thus, leaders should not accept an invitation for a role that appears
to have been offered primarily because of their rank or position.
The Establishment Clause limits governmental action, but not private
religious speech. There is often no clear line of demarcation. In deciding whether
a military member’s speech is private or is as a representative of the government, broad factors such as the status of the speaker, the status of the listener,
and the context and characteristics of the speech itself should be considered.
In the context of religious speech, many of the same factors that indicate the
speech is official also indicate that the speech is coercive, thereby violating the
Establishment Clause. There is no single litmus test, so it is important to look
to all the circumstances. Relevant questions include the following:
•• What is the rank and position of the speaker? The higher the rank and
the greater the position, the more likely it is that the speaker will be seen to
be speaking for the military rather than personally. (Think commanders and
general officers.)
•• What is the rank, position, age, and experience of the listener? Lower
rank and position and youth and inexperience make the listener more likely to
view the speaker as speaking officially and make the listener more susceptible
to coercion.
•• Is the speaker in a position of authority over the listener? The more influence the speaker has over the listener, the more likely the speech is seen to be
official and coercive.
•• Did the speech occur in uniform? If so, this is one factor suggesting the
speech is official.
•• Did the speech occur during duty time? If so, this again is a factor suggesting the speech is official. But religious speech that occurs during a break
may be seen as personal.
•• Were listeners voluntarily present? If listeners are summoned to a meeting,
the ensuing religious speech is likely to be seen as official.
•• Who initiated the religious speech? If a subordinate asks a superior about
the superior’s personal faith, the subordinate likely understands that the superior is speaking personally.
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•• Was the speech planned and formal or extemporaneous and casual? If
planned, and the speaker is introduced by his rank and position, this may reasonably indicate official speech.
•• How extensive (length and religious content) or repeated is the religious
speech? The greater the extent and frequency of the speaker’s religious message,
the more likely the speech is to be perceived as official.
•• What is the rest of the context for the religious speech? If other matters
being discussed by the leader are all official, the religious speech may be more
likely viewed as official too.
•• Did the speaker indicate during the speech that the religious speech is
personal? Use of the first-person “I” favors private speech.
•• Do the circumstances otherwise indicate that the religious speech is personal? For example, a comment to a subordinate facing a personal adversity
that “I’ll keep you and your family in my prayers” is likely to be seen as the
speaker’s personal comment.
•• Is the speech being made by military members in the course of their
official duties? If so, the speech is likely to be viewed as official. Thus, providers of various services that military members are entitled to receive (e.g.,
medical, dental, legal, recreational) should not initiate religious speech with
their customers.
Again, military leaders should consult with their JAG before taking
action against subordinates whose speech crosses the ill-defined Establishment
Clause line. JAGs can provide advice on whether the line has been crossed
and, if so, what action would be appropriate (often simple informal counseling).
Another reason to consult with the JAG is that if the subordinate’s speech has not
crossed the line, the leader who tries to limit the subordinate’s religious speech
likely is violating that subordinate’s free speech rights. This is an example of
the inherent tension existing between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause (and, for religious speech, the Free Speech Clause), which
are framed broadly and are complementary in their purpose of guaranteeing
freedom of religion: by attempting to respect one clause, the government may
offend the other.
Military leaders deciding whether to engage in their own religious
speech, particularly in the workplace, are well advised to err on the side of
caution. The Establishment Clause line can be blurry, particularly as it pertains
to religious speech. Little is to be gained by leaders getting as close to that line
as they can. In fact, leaders who want to get as close to that line as possible
ought to ask themselves why they want to do so. Recall that one of the prongs of
the Lemon test is that the governmental action at issue must have a nonreligious
purpose. Leaders acting in an official capacity who have the purpose of promoting their religious faith in others are acting for a constitutionally impermissible
purpose. Moreover, will such “pushing of the envelope” be in the best interest
of the unit?
Staying well away from the Establishment Clause line amounts to
leaders voluntarily giving up some religious speech rights they would otherwise
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have. Military members accept diminished constitutional rights—as part of
the “service before self” ethos—in other contexts as well. Examples include
the right to free speech (where military members’ speech may be unprotected
when the same speech by a civilian would be protected) and the right against
unreasonable search and seizure (where military members are subject to more
intrusions on their privacy, such as inspections and urinalyses, than would be
permissible in the civilian context, due to the decreased expectation of privacy
that military members have). If all military leaders voluntarily stayed well away
from the Establishment Clause line, the military would have fewer problems
with being accused of promoting religion.
Two important points bear emphasis here. First, leaders should not
suggest to subordinates that they “voluntarily” relinquish some of their religious
speech rights. Such a suggestion by a superior may impermissibly infringe on
the subordinates’ free speech and free exercise rights and ironically may violate
the Establishment Clause by the superior not being officially neutral toward
religion. Second, this is not to suggest that leaders abandon religious speech in
their private capacity. Religion is a tremendous source of strength, inspiration,
wisdom, peace, and purpose for many people, and religious speech is a vital
component of the practice of religion. The admonition here is for leaders to keep
their personal religious speech and practice separate from their official positions,
and to find a way to reconcile their religion with their responsibilities as leaders.

Selected Religious Speech Issues for Leaders
This section provides an overview of potentially thorny issues concerning three forms of religious speech leaders may encounter in the workplace:
proselytizing, prayer, and religious displays. It does so by applying to these
issues the principles previously discussed. We start with the understanding that
each of the forms of speech is constitutionally protected unless it (1) violates
a content- or religion-neutral law, (2) is unprotected speech under the circumstances due to its adverse effect on the mission, or (3) violates the Establishment
Clause by being reasonably viewed as the government advancing, favoring,
endorsing, or coercing a specific religion or religion generally.

Proselytizing in the Workplace
Proselytizing33 in the workplace can become a sensitive issue for leaders
for two related reasons. First, some major world religions—notably Christianity,
the largest religion in the United States and the military34 —encourage their
members to convert nonbelievers to their faith.35 Second, others who do not wish
to be proselytized may complain to superiors about other military members
doing so.
How should leaders respond to such complaints? First, leaders (and
those complaining) must recognize that the First Amendment protects proselytizing and does not require a speaker to stop speaking merely because others do
not like the message. Of the three possible bases upon which to limit religious
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speech, the two most likely to apply to proselytizing are limitations based
on unprotected speech or the Establishment Clause. The proselytizing might
occur in peer-to-peer discussions where the listener does not want to hear the
religious speech and realistically cannot avoid it because of working or living
conditions. The listener first should be advised to make clear to the speaker
his or her desire not to hear more proselytizing and if necessary to avoid voluntary association with the speaker. If disassociation is not possible because
of working or living conditions, and the speaker does not respect the listener’s
desire not to hear more, leaders can take appropriate action if the proselytizing is affecting mission accomplishment or morale, as the proselytizing has
become unprotected speech.
Proselytizing violates the Establishment Clause if military members are
misusing their official position to advance, favor, endorse, or coerce religion.
This might apply to members of the chain of command proselytizing subordinates on duty or to service providers proselytizing customers while providing
a service. Leaders acting in an official capacity must be very sensitive to this
limitation. Consistent with staying well away from the Establishment Clause
line, they should refrain from proselytizing to subordinates in any arguably
duty-related situation unless the subordinate has specifically requested it.

Prayer in the Workplace
Prayer is protected speech, so leaders should allow their subordinates
to exercise their free speech and free exercise rights to pray, even in the workplace, unless there is a constitutionally permissible reason not to. Leaders retain
the right to pray as well, but once again the Establishment Clause limits that
right when it reasonably appears that the leader is acting in an official capacity.
The issue arises most commonly in the context of public prayer at official military functions or ceremonies, such as dining-ins or graduations. Both
the “purpose” and “effect” prongs of the Lemon test are problematic here. The
purpose prong requires a nonreligious purpose for the governmental action.
Can there be such a purpose for having a prayer at an official military function?36 Leaders considering having a prayer at an official function ought to
scrutinize their reason for wanting to do so. If the purpose is to respect the
free exercise rights of those who wish to pray (for example, before a meal at
a dining in), that purpose is equally served by allowing a constitutionally safe
“moment of silence.”37 The “effect” prong is also likely to be problematic for
prayer at official functions (particularly those where attendance is mandatory
or “encouraged”), as the prayer reasonably may be viewed as the government
advancing, favoring, endorsing, or even coercing religion.
Despite these concerns,38 the military has not banned government-led
prayer at official functions. If leaders insist on having prayer (vice a moment of
silence) at these official functions, leaders should not lead the prayer themselves
but should leave this to the chaplains. Their education, training, and experience
praying nonsectarian prayers at such functions, as well as their position outside
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the chain of command, reduce the chance of Establishment Clause violations.
At routine events—such as meetings, staff calls, and meals—leaders should not
invite prayer, even if led by chaplains. Such prayers are almost certain to violate
the Establishment Clause.39
Retirement ceremonies are often a hybrid of official and private functions. If there is a clear time cut-off between the two portions of the ceremony,
the prayer should be in the private time. If the two portions are intertwined, the
master of ceremonies might announce before the prayer that it is at the request
of the retiree.40

Religious Displays in the Workplace
We have already touched on subordinates’ private religious displays
in their barracks rooms: these displays are likely to be protected. On the other
hand, in common areas (such as in common office space or on the common
grounds of a military installation), truly religious displays are prohibited
because they reasonably appear to advance or endorse religion, although some
displays that normally have religious meaning (e.g., a crèche) are permissible
when interspersed with other secular celebrations of the season.41 The JAG can
provide advice concerning these displays in common areas.
Religious displays such as religious art, symbols, or books in an individual’s work area (e.g., the office) present a tougher issue, because that “personal”
workspace likely is visited for official purposes by other military members such
as coworkers or customers. Thus, the individual’s free speech and free exercise
rights will be tempered by Establishment Clause considerations. Displays must
not be so prominent as to make it reasonably appear that their purpose or effect
is governmental promotion of religion. Military members should place their
religious displays such that they are visible to themselves, but are not prominently “in the face” of others who come into that workspace. Leaders must be
particularly sensitive to this issue, given that subordinates may often be present
in their workspace.

Conclusion
Leaders must understand and respect the free speech (and related free
exercise) rights that military members enjoy. They must also understand the
limitations on those rights. Those limitations may be grounded in the Free
Speech Clause itself (content neutral laws and “unprotected” speech) or in the
Establishment Clause. By virtue of their rank and position, leaders need to be
particularly sensitive to how the Establishment Clause limits their speech. By
way of summary, here are principles that should guide all military leaders.

Principles Concerning Subordinates’ Religious Speech
•• Respect subordinates’ religious speech rights protected by the First
Amendment.
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•• Take appropriate action regarding subordinates’ religious speech when
that speech is adversely affecting mission accomplishment, loyalty, discipline,
or morale (i.e., is “unprotected”), when it is contrary to content- and religionneutral laws, or when subordinates violate the Establishment Clause by acting
in their official capacity to advance, favor, or endorse a particular religion or
religion generally.
•• Consult with JAG before taking action against subordinates based on their
religious speech.

Principles Concerning Leaders’ Own Religious Speech
•• Recognize that as leaders their religious speech rights are particularly
limited by the Establishment Clause.
•• Be neutral toward religion. Do not make statements favoring (or disfavoring) or endorsing one religion over another, or religion generally over the
absence of religion.
•• Ask themselves the purpose of their religious speech or display. If its
purpose is to advance a religion (or religion generally), leaders should stop
themselves.
•• Ask themselves the likely effect of their religious speech or display. If it is
likely to be fairly viewed as the government advancing, favoring, endorsing, or
coercing religion, leaders should stop themselves.
•• Consider substituting moments of silence for prayer at official military
functions. If leaders elect to go with the prayer at special functions, entrust it
to chaplains. Avoid prayer at routine meetings.
•• Not try to push the envelope in this area. If in doubt, refrain from speaking.
•• Consult with the JAG as necessary.
Adherence to these principles will help leaders avoid violating the
Constitution and can prevent adverse consequences—including a negative
effect on the unit, its mission, and possibly even US strategic interests—that
may result from such violations. Military members, the unit, and the nation will
be better for it.
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